I. Introduction

In the months leading up to September 11, 2001, the Intelligence Community (IC) received an increasing number of warnings concerning the possibility of an upcoming terrorist attack, however none of these warning contained any specific data to pinpoint exactly when or where such an attack would occur. After that fateful day, hindsight has afforded us a better look at some specific instances that should have thrown up a “red flag” to those tracking the terrorist threats. Unfortunately, there was never enough of a coordinated effort within the IC to connect information across agencies dealing with counterterrorism. This article will scrutinize three specific events, the failure to watch list Khalid al-Hazmi and Nawaf al-Mihdhar; the transmission of the Phoenix Memo; and the apprehension of Zacarious Moussaoui, in order to examine the failed lines of communication within the IC that led to many missed opportunities.

Most of my information pertaining to those three events comes from the Joint Inquiry Staff Statements presented to the Joint Intelligence Committee of the US Congress between the months of September and October 2002. In preparing this article I had to familiarize myself with the “alphabet soup” of acronyms that the Intelligence Community uses in its every day speech. I have done my best to make this article as reader friendly as possible, but it is important to understand that the first communication problem that I encountered as I researched the IC was a language barrier. Those not familiar with IC jargon can get lost in a sea of acronyms that mean nothing to someone new to a department or agency.

Finally, historical knowledge is an important part of “connecting the dots” within the IC. In many instances, if important information had been shared with those people who had historical knowledge of related events, then connections might have been made within the IC that could have sparked further inquiry into suspects and events. This may have uncovered more information on the September 11th plot. For this reason, I have included a history of the Intelligence Community and the growth of terrorism as a threat to US interests so that the reader can better understand the context that the IC was working in previous to 9/11.

Outline - <<Click on outline for navigation>>

I. Introduction
II. Conception and Organization of the Intelligence Community

1. Central Intelligence Agency
2. Federal Bureau of Investigation
3. National Security Agency

III. Terrorism as a Growing Threat

1. Foreign Intelligence Survillance Act
2. Terror in the Regan Era
3. Terrorism in a Post Cold War Era

IV. Events Leading Up to September 11th

1. Failure to Watch list al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar
2. Phoenix Memo, July 2001
3. Apprehension of Zacarious Moussaoui, August 2001

V. Communication Breakdown that made it impossible to "connect the dots."

1. CIA
2. FBI
   1. The Phoenix Memo
   2. Apprehension of Zacarious Moussai

VI. Reorganization of the Intelligence Community post September 11th

1. Homeland Security Act of 2002

VII. Recommendations
VIII. Conclusion
IX. References

Continued below...

II. Conception and Organization of the Intelligence Community

Currently there are fourteen government agencies and organizations that comprise the “Intelligence Community” (IC). These agencies conduct intelligence activities, in whole or in part, for the US government. This article will focus on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with some allusion to the National Security Agency (NSA).

Central Intelligence Agency

The CIA is the primary civilian intelligence-gathering organization in the government. It received this distinction from the National Security Act of 1947, which formally established the agency and gave the Director of Central Intelligence a distinct role within the agency and the government. The act afforded the Agency five functions:

• to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the government departments and agencies as relate to national security;
• to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the government as relate to the national security;
• to correlate and evaluate the intelligence relating to the national security, and to provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using, where appropriate, existing agencies and facilities;
• to perform for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more effectively accomplished centrally; and
• to perform other such functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.

The CIA was created with no domestic authority so as not to infringe upon the powers of the already established FBI. The mission of the CIA is to support all those who make and execute national security policy, including the President and the National Security Council by:

• Providing accurate, evidence-based, comprehensive, and timely foreign intelligence related to national security; and
• Conducting counterintelligence activities, special activities, and other functions related to foreign intelligence and national security as directed by the President.

The organizational structure of the CIA is a hierarchical pyramid with six agencies and councils reporting directly to the Director of Central Intelligence who, in turn, reports to the Inspector General. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) is the sanctioned head of the Intelligence Community. Executive Order 12333 instructs the DCI to do many things, however, for this article I am most concerned with his role in coordinating “foreign intelligence and counterintelligence relationships between agencies of the intelligence community and the intelligence or internal security services of foreign governments.”

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The FBI evolved from the idea of Attorney General Charles Bonaparte (1906-1909) that there should be a federal investigative force designed to fight corruption and crime. He began by borrowing a few special agents from the secret service, however, soon laws were passed limiting his use of the secret service. In 1908, Bonaparte, hiring former secret service agents, appointed a force of special agents within the Department of Justice. These men were to report to the Chief Examiner, whose title would change a year later to Chief of the Bureau of Investigation.
The mission of the FBI is,

“to uphold the law through the investigation of violations of Federal criminal statutes, to protect the United States from hostile intelligence efforts, to provide assistance to other Federal state and local law enforcement agencies, and to perform those responsibilities in a manner that is faithful to the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

It does this with an intensely centralized, hierarchical structure where the weight of the agency falls on the Director’s shoulders and all paperwork flows through headquarters. This structure was given a makeover in December 2001 in response to the 9/11 tragedy and the cumbersome bureaucracy that is embedded within the formal structure.

National Security Agency

As noted, the NSA does not play a large role in this article, however, it is important to be aware of its role within the Intelligence Community since I make several references to their involvement in events that preceded September 11th. Part of the mission of the NSA is to provide communications security for the government. In this respect, it “creates, reviews and authorizes the communications procedures and codes of a variety of government agencies including the State Department, Department of Defense, CIA, and FBI.” This communication link is an important part of an integrated Intelligence Community.

III. Terrorism as a Growing Threat

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

Throughout the years the Judicial branch of the United States Government has come to realize that there needs to be a difference between criminal investigations and investigations that seek foreign intelligence information. This awareness was heightened during the Nixon administration with the publicity surrounding the use of wire-tapping and a renewed concern for US Citizens’ privacy and free speech. In a 1972 Supreme Court ruling , the Court suggested that separate protections be enacted for electronic surveillance concerning domestic security than those covered under the Title III (“wiretapping”) statute, as the latter covered criminal investigations. In the event that a search warrant is necessary to obtain evidence for a prosecution, a criminal investigation is bound by the fourth amendment of the US constitution. Under fourth amendment rules, investigators must prove to a judge that there is probable cause that a crime has been committed or is in the process of being committed. However, in 1978 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) officially made a distinction between the activities of a criminal investigation and intelligence gathering for domestic security (what is known as foreign intelligence information). Under FISA a federal investigator needs to prove that the subject under investigation is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Under the definitions section of the Federal Intelligence Security Act foreign power is defined as “a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor.”

This distinct difference is important because it shapes how an investigator handles the way he collects evidence and/or intelligence, and it affected the investigation of Zacarious Moussaoui, which I will discuss later in this article. FISA was written to give investigators wide-ranging powers in gathering counterintelligence while at the same time protecting US citizens from unnecessary exploitation that can occur under the broad power of foreign intelligence gathering. Therefore, there is a formal process in place that federal investigators must go though in order to be approved for a warrant under FISA.

FISA authority can be obtained for electronic surveillance, physical searches, pen/trap orders, and access to certain business records. Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) was set up to evaluate all FISA applications. Before the applications reach the FISC the Attorney General must personally review each application to make sure that it complies with every standard set in the Act. The standards include a minimization requirement, certification by the NSA that the information to be collected is foreign intelligence information, and a statement attesting that the information to be gathered could not be obtained by normal investigative techniques. The minimization requirement is the safety put in place to protect US citizens’ rights to privacy and freedom of speech. Any federal agent requesting a warrant under FISA must actively try to reduce the “collection, retention and dissemination” of intelligence gathered regarding US citizens.

Although FISA authority must be used for intelligence gathering reasons the information obtained is allowed in criminal court cases. However, because of the minimization requirement an information-screening wall is erected between the federal agent collecting the intelligence and the person working the criminal case. An official not associated with the criminal case is assigned the task of filtering the intelligence so that only information “pertinent” to the criminal investigation is passed “over the wall”. This ensures that the FISA authority is not used for criminal investigations. Unfortunately, it can also create problems because this person becomes the gatekeeper of the intelligence, meaning they are the middleman in a serial transmission.

In a serial transmission there is a chain of senders and receivers for the information being passed. Serial distortion can occur at any place along the chain because each receiver becomes a sender of the transmission that they received and he or she then has the opportunity to change the message that they are sending. The sender can distort the message in four ways by adding information to the message, assimilating the message by making it more positive, sharpening the messages to make it more exciting, or leveling the message to take out things that they do not think are necessary. The official who chooses which intelligence is pertinent to the criminal investigation is essentially leveling the information that the intelligence community has collected. This creates many communication problems because a person with no ties to the criminal investigation is given the authority to discern what is important for the criminal investigators to solve their case. This issue, along with others concerning the application process for FISA authority, will be discussed in further depth later in this article.

Terrorism in the Reagan Era

With the start of the 1980’s terrorism became a domestic priority within the Reagan Administration. An increase in attacks against US embassies and military bases overseas compelled President Reagan to issue National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) Number 30. NSDD 30 specified which federal agencies would take the lead in terrorist incidents. It gave the State Department control over international terrorism, the FBI would be in charge of domestic cases, and the FAA would handle all incidents where aircrafts are concerned. In 1986, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) created the Counterterrorism Center (CTC) as the focal point for counterterrorism operations. This department, located within the CIA, was created in direct response to the White House’s acknowledgement that state sponsored terrorism was a growing threat to US interests. That same year, President Reagan issued NSDD 207 that stated the US stance on terrorism as

“…firm opposition to terrorism in all its forms…The policy is based upon the conviction that to accede to terrorist demands places more Americans at risk…the United States…is prepared to act in concert with other nations or unilaterally when necessary to prevent or respond to terrorist acts.”

Terrorism in a Post Cold War Era

The next wave of legislation regarding terrorism took place in the 1990’s during the Clinton administration. With the collapse of the Soviet Union the threat of a nuclear holocaust was no longer as imminent as it had been during the Cold War era and the threat of terrorism was changing. No longer were groups necessarily being funded by rebel states; now militant groups were arming themselves and targeting more civilians than political figures and places.

The first attack on American soil took place in 1993 when the World Trade Center was bombed for the first time. Islamic terrorists planted a large bomb in the parking garage of one of the towers, killing six people and wounding over a thousand. In 1995, President Clinton issued Presidential Directive 39, which outlined a more detailed US counterterrorism policy. This directive assigned new leads to various departments within the Intelligence Community, mostly associated with reducing vulnerabilities to employees, citizens, and infrastructure. For example, the FBI was given the lead to expand their program on counterterrorism, while the CIA was assigned as the lead agency in the collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action concerning international terrorism as set out in the National Security Act of 1947. Under this directive the FBI established their Counterterrorism Unit along with an Usama bin Ladin Unit and a Radical Fundamentalist Unit.

By this time Usama bin Ladin had been identified by the Intelligence Community as a major financial resource, if not planner, of Islamic terrorist activity. His 1996 Fatwa called all Muslims to participate in an international Jihad, and his 1998 Fatwa specifically cited US citizens as the target of the Jihad,

“The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and military -- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.”

A Fatwa is a religious decree issued by an Islamic religious leader. This document would later be used as evidence against Usama bin Ladin for the September 11th World Trade Center bombing.

On August 7, 1998, the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar-es-Salem, Tanzania were heavily damaged by massive bomb attacks that occurred simultaneously. US intelligence blamed Islamic groups associated with Usama bin Ladin for the attacks and heightened their concern surrounding Usama bin Ladin due to the level of planning such an attack involves. On December 4, 1998, DCI George Tenet issued a memorandum to his deputies at the CIA declaring war against Usama bin Ladin. This sense of urgency towards Usama bin Ladin, his actions, and his associates, however, was not transferred to the entire IC. Each agency was caught up in their own priorities; there were few coordinated efforts.

IV. Events leading up to September 11th

Failure to Watch list al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar

The Intelligence Community was on heightened alert in December 1999 due to the expectation of possible terrorist activity planned to coincide with major Millennium festivities in large cities all over the world. Around this time, from January 5-8, 2000, the CIA observed a meeting of individuals, believed to be associated with Usama bin Ladin, in Malaysia. Khalid al-Hazmi and Nawaf al-Mihdhar, both September 11th hijackers, were present at this meeting. Although it is not known what was discussed at the meeting, the CIA deemed it to be an assembly of al-Qa’ida associates. At the conclusion of the meeting al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi traveled together to another Southeast Asian country.

At this point, the CIA had identified Khalid al-Mihdhar’s full name, passport number, birth information, and the fact that he held a US B-1/B-2 multiple-entry visa that would not expire until April 6, 2000. They also had indications that Nawaf’s last name was al-Hazmi. They were not aware that the NSA had information linking Nawaf al-Hazmi with the Bin Ladin Network. This information was in the NSA database, but it was not immediately disseminated. At this time, al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar could have been added to the State Department, INS, and US Customs service watch lists denying individuals entry into the US; however, they were not.

The main database that I am speaking of in this section of the article is the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS). This database was created in 1994 to prevent US Consular offices from issuing visas to “inadmissible aliens”. Within the CLASS system is another database called TIPOFF. TIPOFF is an intelligence database fed mostly by the NSA, CIA, and FBI. It is designed to enhance border security “by using classified intelligence information and privileged law enforcement material to identify terrorists…” Any consular issuing a visa or person performing security checks at US points of entry must cross reference these two databases with the applicant’s information. At a consulate office, if the check results in a “hit” then a double zero (00) is generated by the search. This indicates that the applicant’s information must be sent to the State Department in DC where a field officer is required to supply a formal response before a visa can be issued. In the event that a border officer checking an applicant received a “hit” they would simply deny entry. It is important to note that previous to September 11th people visiting the US were only subject to these databases, including those used by INS, upon application to, entry to, and departure from the United States. People flying within the US were not subject to these security checks.

In January 2000, the CIA reportedly informed the FBI of al-Mihdhar’s presence at the Malaysia meeting, but did not divulge the information concerning his visa status. In addition, the CIA agent noted that he told one FBI agent that:

“…this continues to be an [intelligence] operation. Thus far, a lot of suspicious activity has been observed but nothing that would indicate evidence of an impending attack.”

Therefore, the agent surmised that he would inform the FBI once something concrete surfaced and the FBI agent agreed that this was a fine approach and emailed his superior. He reported that the “CIA is reporting relevant information as it becomes available.”

The CIA continued to be interested in the two suspects and learned in March 2000 that al-Hazmi had entered the United States on January 15, 2000. They did not connect that fact that al-Hazmi had been traveling with al-Mihdhar within Southeast Asia and therefore they may have continued on together to the United States. In fact, al-Mihdhar entered the US on the same date. Again these two individuals could have been added to the watch list at this time. Even though they were already in the US the watch lists would have alerted authorities if they tried to leave. Also, the CIA never informed the FBI or local law enforcement officials that these two individuals had entered the US. This kind of information sharing could have prompted domestic investigative efforts such as surveillance.

The CIA appears to have “dropped” the investigation of those involved in the Malaysia meeting when the CIA employee in charge of the case moved on to other issues. By the summer of 2000, no CIA officer was following the al-Mihdhar group.

On October 12, 2000, there was a terrorist attack on the USS Cole as the Navy destroyer was refueling in Yemen. FBI officials investigating the attack discovered that two people present at the January 2000 Malaysia meeting were directly involved in the planning or funding of the attack. They took this information to the CIA, which prompted agents to take another look at the meeting. This information was significant because it meant that other members at the meeting had direct contact with the planners of this attack. By this time it was January 2001 and al-Hazmi was still in the US while al-Mihdhar was abroad. Again, each individual could have been watch listed at this time since they were both present at the Malaysia meeting, but they were not.

In May 2001, the CIA shared photographs taken from the 2000 meeting in Malaysia with an Intelligence Operations Specialist (IOS) at FBI Headquarters hoping that an individual in custody for the USS Cole bombing was one of the individuals at the meeting. The CIA told the FBI IOS about the Malaysia meeting and subsequent travel of al-Mihdhar to Southeast Asia, but never mentioned the potential travel to the US. On July 4, 2001, after receiving a new visa, al-Mihdhar reentered the US.

Then in July 2001, a CIA agent assigned to the FBI brought to the Director of Central Intelligence’s (DCI) attention the fact that the perpetrator of the USS Cole attack and possibly the Africa embassy bombing had been present at the Malaysia meeting. This prompted a review of all prior information regarding the Malaysia meeting, a task given to an FBI agent assigned to the Counterterrorism Center (CTC) under the DCI.

On August 21, 2001, the agent connected two key pieces of information: the information concerning al-Mihdhar’s multiple entry visa (acquired by the CIA in January 2000), and the entrance of al-Hazmi into the US on January 15, 2000 (acquired by the CIA in March 2000). Then working with the INS agent assigned to the CTC the FBI analyst was able to piece together the rest of the two individual’s travel patterns. The timing of their entry into the US further aroused his suspicions. Finally, on August 24, 2001, the CIA sent a cable to the State Department, INS, Customs Service, and the FBI requesting that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar be watch listed and denied entry into the United States. The CIA stated their reasoning as “due to their confirmed links to Egyptian Islamic Jihad operatives and suspicious activities while traveling in East Asia.”

The FBI was still not notified that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were already in the United States and only after conducting their own investigation did they determine such information. The INS was also never asked to locate the two suspects, even though both of their visas had expired.

Phoenix Memo, July 2001

On July 10, 2001, a special agent from the FBI field office in Phoenix, AZ sent an electronic communication (EC) to FBI Headquarters outlining his concern that Usama bin Ladin may be sending students to the United States to receive civil aviation training in a coordinated effort to undertake more terrorist activity. He was concerned with the “inordinate number of individuals of investigative interest” enrolled in aviation schools located in Arizona. He recommended several steps that should be taken to investigate this situation.

• Headquarters should accumulate a list of civil aviation university/colleges around the country;
• FBI offices should establish liaison with the schools;
• Headquarters should discuss the Phoenix theories with the intelligence community;
• Headquarters should consider seeking authority to obtain visa information on individuals seeking to attend flight schools.

An electronic communication (EC) is the primary way to send classified, internal information throughout the FBI. The system is similar to email in its electronic nature and capabilities; however, it is different because all documents sent over the electronic system have a classified status. When special agents send an EC they can request a lead be put on the memo. An EC with a lead attached to it ensures that the office receiving the memo follows up on any requests that the memo may have. In the lead section of the memo the sending office may outline exactly what actions they would like to see taken. Once the receiving office takes the necessary steps to cover the lead they must inform the sending office of their results, thus closing the lead and the EC.

This system has some inherent problems due to faulty technology and arbitrary assignment of leads. The EC is often addressed to several people. In this case, the special agent in Phoenix addressed his EC to members of the Usama bin Ladin Unit (UBLU) and the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU), including supervisors within each unit. However, due to limitations in the electronic dissemination system this EC was never seen by anyone in a supervisory role. In fact, the EC only reached a handful of those on the “To:” list. The FBI’s electronic system is not designed to reach everyone on the addressee list. The EC is sent to the unit and then electronically forwarded to the person assigned the lead. This was an ongoing problem associated with the electronic communication system.

In order to deal with this deficiency the personnel within the FBI had come up with an informal system to make sure that EC’s were sent to those that needed to see it. Those assigned the lead for an EC were in charge of distributing the EC to the part of the list that did not receive it. Unfortunately, the system for choosing a person assigned the lead was just as makeshift. The person chosen to work the lead was often the first person on the addressee list with a non-supervisory role. Therefore, the person may have no direct relation to the contents of the memo and so no historical background with the subject to make qualified decisions on how to handle the lead and who to distribute the information to.

On July 30, 2001, an Intelligence Assistant in the RFU at FBI Headquarters assigned the lead for the Phoenix Memo to a woman chosen, “not because the assignment was within her programmatic area of responsibility, but because her name was the first non-supervisory name on the addressee list.” Even though the sender requested that a lead be taken up by both the UBLU and the RFU the receiver determined that the project should be allocated to the UBLU. However, the UBLU Intelligence Operations Specialist (IOS) did not want the lead transferred and instead agreed to be in charge of her unit’s response without taking full responsibility of the lead assignment.

The UBLU’s IOS engaged colleagues in a discussion regarding the legality of the Phoenix Agent’s suggestion concerning authority to obtain visa information of people looking to enroll in flight school. However, they never consulted FBI lawyers and were unaware of past events where similar requests were made. If they had then they would have known that previously arrangements had been made whereby the INS had provided the FBI with student visa information for investigative purposes. Instead, the Intelligence Operations Specialists determined amongst themselves that the request raised profiling issues. None of the other requests were ever acted upon. On August 7, 2001, both the Intelligence Operations Specialist (IOS) in the Usama bin Ladin Unit (UBLU) and the IOS in the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) decided to close the lead on the Phoenix memo. At that point the UBLU’s IOS had forwarded the EC on to an intelligence analyst in Portland who was interested in a similar subject matter, but only titled the memo “FYI”. No supervisors in either unit ever saw the Phoenix memo prior to September 11th and no one was able to connect the Phoenix memo with the possible presence of Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, the apprehension of Zacarious Moussaoui, or the flood of warnings about possible terrorist attacks during the summer of 2001.

Apprehension of Zacarious Moussaoui, August 2001

On February 23, 2001, Zacarious Moussaoui entered the United States on a French passport that allowed him to stay in the US without a visa for 90 days, until May 22. On February 26, he began flight lessons at Airman Flight School in Oklahoma to learn how to pilot small Cessna aircrafts. Then, on August 13 Moussaoui, on an expired passport, began classes at Pan Am Flight School in Minnesota. The difference between the Airman Flight School and the Pan Am Flight School is the kind of training they provide. The Pan Am Flight School specializes in ground training, and students have access to a Boeing 747 flight simulator. Therefore, this school mostly attracts newly hired airline pilots for training or current pilots for refresher courses; “The typical student has a pilot’s license, is employed by an airline, and has several thousand flight hours.” Moussaoui did not match any of these qualities. This raised suspicion in a private citizen, who notified the FBI.

On August 15, 2001, the FBI’s Minneapolis Field Office opened an international investigation of Moussaoui. The Minneapolis Field Office hosts one of the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) programs. This means that FBI agents work alongside INS and CIA agents. The program is designed to create a better environment for information sharing and utilization of the Intelligence Community’s tools. This connection allowed the FBI to determine that day, because of the INS agent that worked in the Field Office, that Moussaoui’s visa was currently “out of status”. Minneapolis also asked the CIA and the FBI legal attaché in Paris for any information, while at the same time informing FBI Headquarters of the investigation. FBI Headquarters suggested that Moussaoui be put under surveillance, but Minneapolis was too understaffed for such an operation. In addition, the field office felt that it was more important to stop Moussaoui from receiving any further training than to survey his movements.

That same day FBI agents apprehended Moussaoui at his hotel room and confiscated his belongings, including a laptop computer. The FBI wished to search Moussaoui’s computer, but under federal law a warrant must be produced if the suspect does not comply with a search. At this point the FBI had three options to find out what was on the computer. They could open a criminal investigation of Moussaoui and apply for a search warrant, they could apply for FISA search privileges, or they could wait until Moussaoui was deported back to France and have the French authorities search the computer. FBI Headquarters advised Minneapolis to try for a warrant under FISA because a criminal search warrant might prejudice any future efforts to obtain a FISA warrant. Headquarters was worried that the FISA court may think that the FBI was trying to use intelligence authority in a criminal case.

The Minneapolis office was working within some rather large constraints. Although they had detained Moussaoui, INS informed them that such passport offenders were not normally detained for more than 48 hours before being deported. However, because they believed that Moussaoui posed a threat they would extend that time period to 7-10 days. In addition, FBI Headquarters relayed to the special agent in Minneapolis that Moussaoui must be identified as part of a “recognized foreign power” in order to be covered under a FISA warrant. Therefore, field operatives in Minneapolis spent the better part of three weeks trying to link the Chechen rebel group (a group not recognized by the State Department) that they had paired Moussaoui with to al-Qa’ida (a terrorist group recognized by the State Department). In the mean time, the Supervisory Special Agent in the RFU that was in charge of the Moussaoui FISA application continued to change parts of their application, reject their reasoning within the application, and failed to synthesize information that he was privy to that could have completed the application. These actions were based on a false knowledge of the FISA application standards and procedures due to poor training and a lack of accountability within the Bureau.

On August 28, the RFU agent made some final changes to the 26-page application that the field office had transmitted to him through Electronic Communication. The most substantive change was the deletion of the connection that the field office had written relating the Chechen rebels to al-Qa’ida. The RFU agent then orally briefed the FBI Deputy General Counsel on the application. The Deputy General Counsel agreed with the RFU agent that there was insufficient evidence to show that Moussaoui was an agent of a foreign power. The agent then told the field office to stop pursuing the FISA warrant and begin arranging for Moussaoui’s planned deportation to France on September 17.

The criminal search warrant option was never revisited even though the only previous hindrance was the fear that pursuing a criminal search warrant would disrupt the chance of obtaining a FISA application. On September 11, 2001, authorities finally obtained a criminal search warrant to search the laptop stating the same reasons for probable cause as can be found in the original FISA application.

V. Communication Breakdown within the Intelligence Community that made it impossible to “connect the dots”

I will be examining the breakdown in communication within the Intelligence Community using the Systems Theory of Communication. The Systems Theory asserts that in order for an organization to perform at maximum efficiency all departments must be linked, each department should be open and aware of the environment around them, the organization must also be aware of the external environment it is in, and the organization must be willing to adapt and innovate as its environment changes. All of this needs to be accompanied by a receptive climate and formal lines of communication that all staff are aware of and believe to be legitimate in order for communication to flow freely throughout the organization. Several communication networks exist to facilitate the flow of communication. Downward networks facilitate communication from a superior to a subordinate. Upward networks exist for subordinates to be able to communicate with superiors. Horizontal networks allow co-workers and departments within an organization to communicate. External networks are channels for people outside of the organization to contact people within the organization. Internal networks are channels for those within the organization to communicate on. Formal networks are the prescribed methods of communication that the organization has set out. Finally, informal networks are the networks not prescribed by the organization. All of these networks failed at some point during the events leading up to September 11th.

CIA

The intelligence investigation of al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi brought to light many deficiencies in the formal lines of communication within the CIA. First, the failure to watch list both individuals several times shows a lack of downward communication in communicating proper task procedures. There are three kinds of messages that are sent along the downward network: task, maintenance, and human. Task messages refer to how a person does their job. Maintenance messages concern procedural messages, like the dress code. Lastly, human messages relate to comments of positive feedback or personal concern.

CIA personnel were not adequately trained on proper watch listing procedure. In reality, there was no formal training for submitting names to a watch list, agents learned “on the job”. In fact, the judicial inquiry found that prior to September 11th the CIA had not clearly related to personnel at the Counterterrorism Center (CTC) what they needed to know about the process. This meant that watch listing happened on an individual basis depending on an agent’s understanding of the process, personal experience with the system, and how other agencies received and used the information provided to the database.

Because there was no formal system in place the CTC experienced organizational forgetting. Organizational forgetting, a phrase developed by organizational communications scholar Phil Tompkins, occurs over time as turnover and less emphasis on a task takes place. This leads an organization to no longer practice what it once did. As a result CIA agents held an unusually high standard in place for people to be put on the watch list. The threshold to place people into TIPOFF is low. In order for a person to be placed on the watch list there needed to be “reasonable suspicion” that they were a terrorist or were affiliated with a terrorist organization. Yet most personnel, including the agent that finally initiated the watch listing procedure, waited until they had a relatively high measure of proof of such activity before entering names into the watch list.

The second network that failed was the external, horizontal network. The CIA neglected to share pertinent information with the FBI that could have furthered their criminal investigation into the USS Cole bombing. This failure illustrates the gap between intelligence and law enforcement counterterrorism efforts. Such a gap exists because of the different cultures, jurisdictions, and improper understanding of what can and cannot be shared by the intelligence community. The culture prevalent at the CIA concerning information sharing can be characterized by “need to know”. The CIA worked on a “need to know” basis with supervisors identifying those who needed to know. This meant that at the June 11, 2001 meeting where CIA officials showed FBI agents photographs from the January 2000 Malaysia meeting the CIA official did not alert the FBI that the suspect in the photograph had a US B1/B2 visa. The CIA official later told members of the Joint Inquiry staff that “he would not share information outside of the CIA unless he had the authority to do so and unless that was the purpose of the meeting.”

I have already talked about the “wall” that the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act erects between intelligence gathering and criminal investigations. There is a second kind of wall that the CIA agent was alluding to. It is a self-imposed wall within the intelligence community used to protect sources and methods. However, the bombing of the USS Cole was a federal investigation. As such its level of importance should have been high enough to breach this second wall. Ultimately, the fear that pervaded the CIA and FBI concerning what information could and could not be shared hampered both members of the Intelligence Community’s progress. Their misunderstanding may be attributed to a risk adverse culture. This culture permeated the agencies after a FBI agent was barred from the FISA court for mishandling intelligence under FISA rules.

The CIA had one last chance to utilize their external horizontal, network and identify the seriousness of al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi when they were finally watch listed on August 24, 2001. However, they alerted neither the FBI nor the INS about the possible al-Qa’ida terrorist links or the fact that both were in the country. Part of this failure is due to inadequate databases. The watch lists are not able to communicate the level of danger individuals may pose beyond the possible associations that they have. Also, even though both individuals were finally watch listed not all members of the intelligence community have access to the watch lists suspects are placed on. This has to do with issues of security clearance. Agencies that do not have personnel with clearance to access these databases are missing out on a vast intelligence resource. Often times this lack of clearance stems from the process, which can take as long as a year and a half for someone to get through.

FBI

The Phoenix Memo

The most obvious network that failed, in the case of the Phoenix Memo, is the formal network that the Electronic Communication (EC) traveled on. The Electronic System was known to have problems; in fact, the FBI is infamous for its antiquated technology. The staff, having little choice, had dealt with it by building an informal network. Informal networks develop for several reasons. The formal network may be slow or may not carry the necessary information. There may not be any prescribed network for communication. Also, spatial factors can render impractical formal networks that do exist.

Since the Electronic System is not designed to send electronic communications to every addressee people within the FBI “fixed” this by giving the agent in charge of the lead this task. However, the person assigned the lead was arbitrarily chosen from the addressee list. Usually, it was the first person with a non-supervisory role. This means that the person assigned the lead is given the responsibility of being a gatekeeper, but may not have the background to discern who should receive the EC and who should not. Of course, they should forward the message on to everyone listed, but over time their role has taken on a filtering aspect, whereby they decide who should receive the message.

Specific to the Phoenix EC, the upward network failed because the lead never passed the message along to supervisors within the UBLU or the RFU. No one with a background in investigations regarding terrorism and airplanes received the message. Also, because it is common at the FBI that agents are usually only familiar with their own cases and will not know details about investigations going on in other squads, no one was able to identify the importance of the EC, the recommendations were ignored, and the memo was given little attention. This case specific mentality is characteristic of a “silo mentality”. The “silo mentality” occurs when departments begin to “perceive themselves as discrete entities that perform independently.” However, as the Systems Theory acknowledges this is not the most productive way for an organization to function “since departments in organizations are inherently interdependent and not independent.”

One last comment needs to be made regarding the Electronic System. The system is designed to be receiver centered, meaning that the sender knows that the message has been received once the receiver receives the message, but in reality it did not meet this goal. The lead that the sender can elect to put on the EC guarantees feedback to the original message and allows the sender to determine if there was message fidelity. However, once a lead is closed it is not usually reopened, and the electronic system fails in allowing for message fidelity because it cannot guarantee that the message will get to all addressees.

Separate from the failures in the Electronic system is the failure of FBI Headquarters to respond to any of the recommendations that the Phoenix Agent delineated. The fact that the only recommendation discussed concerned an operational aspect of acquiring visa information for foreign nationals attending flight school is symptomatic of the FBI’s short-term operational priorities. An analyst within the UBLU would have best handled the recommendations because they would have had the tools and the time to devote to this kind of a project; however, a brain drain was active in the analytical units of the FBI. Since there was such a shortage of good agents in the investigative branches any time a competent analyst was hired they were immediately transferred to an operational unit. On September 11th there was one analyst working on al-Qa’ida related material. This myopic vision caused a greater communication problem because instead of seeing systemic problems by looking at the big picture, the FBI was case driven and prone to solving smaller problems. They were not in what Tompkins has referred to as the “Earthquake Prediction Business” because they were brushing aside warning signs of larger problems that were looming. This focus on the operational is why the Intelligence Operations Specialists closed the Phoenix EC prematurely.

Apprehension of Zacarious Moussaoui

The apprehension of Moussaoui began with very smooth lines of communication due to the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) established in Minneapolis. The function of a JTTF is to act as a force multiplier. This means that all agents are treated like FBI staff and given the same access to information. The INS agent on the JTTF is typically the most highly lauded member of a JTTF because of countless occasions where overstays on visas allowed the FBI to apprehend a suspected terrorist. The Moussaoui apprehension was no different. The horizontal network worked and Minneapolis FBI Agents were able to arrest Moussaoui because his visa had expired.

Although that network worked, several others fell short. The operational focus mentioned earlier in the handling of the Phoenix Memo can also be seen in the case of Zacarious Moussaoui. FBI Headquarters suggested that Minnesota put Moussaoui under surveillance, but Minneapolis was too understaffed for such an operation, and believed that stopping Moussaoui’s flight instruction was more important. If Minneapolis had had a more long-range vision they would have allocated the proper resources to an investigation of Moussaoui’s actions instead of immediately arresting him once they found out he had a visa violation. The following confusion over the FISA application may have been averted if such tactics had been employed.

The main communication network that failed in the FISA application process is the downward network from FBI Headquarters to the Minneapolis Field Office. To understand how the network failed, you need to know the role that Headquarters plays in helping field offices apply for FISA warrants. Headquarters’ main role is to “add value” to field offices. They do this in three ways. Their first function is purely ministerial; they assemble the FISA application in the proper format so that it may be reviewed by the FISA Court. The next function is more substantive; Headquarters assists the field offices by being expert on the legal aspects of FISA and by providing guidance on the FISA application requirements. Finally, Headquarters functions to supplement and strengthen FISA applications by adding intelligence information that only they are privy to so that the clauses of “probable cause” and “agent of a foreign power” are met.

Headquarters misinformed Minneapolis about the correct guidelines for the application. Minneapolis was told that they needed to prove that Moussaoui was part of a recognized foreign power. This was an incorrect perception; Moussaoui only needed to have “probable cause” that he was an “agent of a foreign power”. Headquarters also misinterpreted the probable cause clause. They were asking Minneapolis to provide too much of the wrong kind of information, without adding any of their own intelligence to help Minneapolis’ case. During the period of time that the application procedure was happening the Phoenix memo was in the FBI database. That memo could have provided the extra evidence needed to establish “probable cause” Unfortunately, the agent at Headquarters in charge of the FISA application never queried the database. That agent also deleted from the Minneapolis application most of the section containing the work that Minneapolis had done to link the Chechen rebel group with al-Qa’ida. The agent did not believe that the evidence was strong enough. However, when the agent briefed the FBI lawyers on the feasibility of obtaining a warrant with the evidence that had been found, he did so in an oral meeting about the al-Qa’ida link not about the guidelines for a FISA application. The FBI lawyer never saw the physical application written up by Minneapolis. There is a greater chance for message distortion of oral messages than of written ones. The FBI lawyer agreed with the agent that the Minneapolis case was too weak. If the agent had actually seen the application he may have come to a different conclusion because he might have realized the entire misinterpretation of FISA guidelines that Headquarters was working with. Headquarters unsuccessfully met its “value added” function for the Minneapolis application so much so that it never got to the ministerial function. The attempt to secure a FISA application was dropped once the FBI lawyer agreed that there was not enough conclusive evidence to link Moussaoui to the al-Qa’ida network.

VI. Reorganization of the Intelligence Community post September 11th

Homeland Security Act of 2002

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 created the Department of Homeland Security in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th. The Department or DHS is a cabinet level office that will encompass 22 existing agencies under one Secretary in order to help support its mission “to help prevent terrorist attacks in the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorist attacks, and minimize the damage and assist in recovery from attacks that do occur.” To accomplish this mission the Department is organized by five Divisions or Directorates that report directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security. The five divisions are Management, Science and Technology, Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, Border and Transportation Security, and Emergency Preparedness and Response. I will be examining the role of the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) directorate to see the strides that have been taken to improve information sharing within the Intelligence Community.

DHS submitted a reorganization plan for the Department of Homeland Security to Congress on November 25, 2002. The reorganization plan lists dates for different restructurings to be completed and goals to be accomplished. The IAIP will be in place by September 30, 2003 with an Under Secretary and Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis overseeing the division’s information sharing functions. These functions include (but are not limited to) the analysis of terrorist threats taking into account actual and potential weaknesses of the homeland, the integration of relevant information to identify priorities within the counterterrorism community, the responsibility to ensure timely and efficient information sharing between all other agencies of the Federal Government and the Department, the role of recommending better policies and procedures governing the sharing of intelligence information between all levels of the government, the dissemination of analyzed information to other agencies to help prevent terrorist attacks, the creation of a secure information technology infrastructure to facilitate the sharing of information acquired by the Department, and the coordination of training and other support to those agencies that share information with the Department to improve the utilization of all tools available to the Intelligence Community.

The IAIP has been set up to merge the capabilities of a number of different departments under one roof to better identify and assess the broad range of terrorist intelligence that the IC receives on a daily basis. It will coordinate and, as appropriate, consolidate the lines of communication between the federal, state and local governments to aid the flow of important information. The division is also in charge of the Homeland Security Advisory System.

VII. My Recommendations

Unfortunately, the Department is still too young to completely analyze how effective it will be in improving our fight against terrorism. The information available at this time refers to the broad powers of each directorate instead of specific plans to handle each function the directorate is in charge of. A recent report published by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) criticized the Department for not taking clearer steps to open lines of communication between departments involved in counterterrorism. The five Directorates have a huge responsibility to improve the current IC without causing another layer of bureaucracy where information can be lost or mishandled. In response to the three cases that I have outlined in this article I now offer my own recommendations on how the IC can overcome some of its communication pitfalls.

The failure to watch list al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi brought to light weaknesses in training and the watch list programs themselves. The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection directorate will now be in charge of training those in DHS on the tools available to the IC. For the watch lists, this training must include the threshold required to enter a suspect into the database and the uses of the database to those within Intelligence Community. This way each agent is aware of the departments around them and how they utilize information. The Systems Theory recognizes that departments are interdependent by nature; therefore, each department must practice penetration in order to be more aware of each other’s cases and issues. Reeducation of current employees and training of new employees is one way of ensuring that each person is made aware of what is going on around them.

The watch lists themselves cause problems because each department has their own and not all agencies work with the same technology. This means that many watch lists are inaccessible to certain agencies due to technology impairments or lack of security clearance. Although it is impossible and ill advised to homogenize the Intelligence Community by creating one watch list, a centralized watch list that culls information from each agency’s database that can be accessed by certain security cleared personnel would allow the IC to have more equal footing. This would give the local police access to intelligence that may be helpful in its domestic efforts and provide federal agencies with a simple solution to disseminating the information that they need to share.

The Phoenix EC uncovered problems in obsolete technology and understaffing, as well as an agency culture that hindered information sharing to other agencies. Obviously the equipment that the FBI is using must be updated and brought in line with others within the IC. Also, adding more staff will help the FBI put more emphasis on long term analysis of intelligence instead of its more case centered philosophy it had adopted because there will be more people to handle that kind of information. However, this will only happen if the organization undergoes a major culture shift. The FBI, as well as the CIA, has an information ownership mentality. The FBI experiences more prestige with the more cases it solves and these concrete results fuels the agency to continue to operate in the short term. This is why the FBI moved most of its analysts into the field. The CIA has imposed its own boundaries on what information should be shared and what information should not to protect the civil liberties of US citizens and its agents from the law. The IAIP can re-train each agent on the legal stipulations of information sharing, but without the supervisors of each agent reinforcing a new culture of open communication the FBI and CIA will continue to operate like it did before September 11th. Clear methods of information sharing should be set up. The easiest way to handle this is to utilize the Joint Terrorism Task Forces that employ personnel from several agencies who can disseminate the information they are working on to their own agencies for follow up action.

The apprehension of Zacarious Moussaoui demonstrated how well information can flow when systems are open and functioning, as was the case of the JTTF in Missouri. However, the system failed at sharing the correct information between departments that were thousands of miles away (between Missouri and Headquarters) because each department was on a different page. Headquarters was focused on the legal proceedings of obtaining a FISA warrant while Missouri simply wanted a warrant to search the laptop. Headquarters communicated the wrong kind of information to Missouri regarding FISA applications and because there was no check and balance in the system no one realized the mistake until after September 11th.

Fortunately, this kind of discrepancy is addressed in the DHS. The Office of Inspector General will serve as an independent and objective “inspection, audit, and investigative body to promote effectiveness, efficiency, and economy in the Department of Homeland Security’s programs and operations, and to prevent and detect fraud, abuse, mismanagement, and waste in such programs and operations.” This office will hopefully keep each agency aware of any misconceptions that they may have.

VIII. Conclusion

It is not clear if watch listing al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar and linking the Phoenix memo and the apprehension of Moussaoui with the other terrorism threats would have surfaced the 9/11 terrorist plot or not. However, in the least that kind of open communication would have made it harder for terrorist factions to stay underneath the Intelligence Community’s radar. The Department of Homeland Security seeks to integrate the Intelligence Community to better facilitate the flow of information between agencies to keep terrorists from alluding our agents, however the department is too young to elaborate on its full potential.

The IC faces fragmentation, technological impediments and ineffective collaboration. The fragmentation has developed from ineffectual or nonexistent training of agents on proper procedures. The technological impediments are inexcusable when the terrorists of today are using the most modern equipment to plan their attacks.

Finally, the ineffective collaboration continues because it is part of the culture of each organization. There is a mentality of information ownership within each agency that needs to be dispelled. The only way for the IC to be one hundred percent effective is to utilize all of its resources to its fullest. This means that intelligence must be distributed throughout the community in a timely fashion. This is a controversial topic because it requires the removal of several “walls” that have been built to protect civil rights. Nevertheless, not all of the walls are there to protect civil liberties, some stem from misconceptions in federal law and risk adverse cultures that have developed over the years.

A reeducation of the agencies that deal with counterterrorism needs to take place in the tools that they have, including the function of the agencies around them. Once the IC is aware of each other and each other’s functions information will be able to flow more freely. Until then, the IC is at a disadvantage to terrorist cells that openly communicate to each other.

Melissa Bator

IX: References

1. The more research I conducted the more problems I found that plagued the Intelligence Community. The information presented in this paper is a cross-section of those communication problems that I was able to glean from the declassified documents I was privy to.
2. US Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Compilation of Intelligence Laws and related Laws and Executive Orders of Interest to the National Intelligence Community (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 7.
3. “CIA Vision, Mission, and Values,” April 12, 2002, http://www.cia.gov/cia/information/mission.html (March 24, 2003).
4. Reagan, Ronald, “Executive Order 12333: United States Intelligence Activities,” p. 59943.
5. Mission Statement found in Jeffreys, Diarmuid, The Bureau-Inside the Modern FBI, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1995: p.8.
6. Richelson, Jeffrey, The US Intelligence Community, Westview Press, 1995: p. 26.
7. United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 US 297, 1972.
8. 50 U.S.C. §1801 (1978).
9. “Electronic Privacy Information Center,” November 22, 2002, http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/fisa/default.html (March 24, 2003).
10. Zaremba, Alan Jay, Organizational Communication Foundations for Business & Management, Thompson South-Western, 2003: pp. 138-140.
11. Reagan, “National Security Decision Directive Number 30,” April 10, 1982, http://www.gwu.edu/%7Ensarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB55/nsdd30.pdf (April 1, 2003).
12. Reagan, “NSDD 207,” January 20, 1986, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-2715a.gif (April 1, 2003).
13. Clinton, William Jefferson, “Presidential Decision Directive 39,” June 21, 1995, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm (April 1, 2003).
14. bin Ladin, Usama, “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, World Islamic Front Statement,” February 23, 1998, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm (March 1, 2003).
15. Hill, Eleanor, “Joint Inquiry Staff Statement Part 1,” September 18, 2002, http://intelligence.senate.gov/0209hrg/020918/hill.pdf (February 10, 2002): p. 18.
    Hill, “The Intelligence Community’s Knowledge of the September 11 Hijackers Prior to September 11,” 2001,” September 20, 2002, http://intelligence.senate.gov/0209hrg/020920/hill.pdf (February 10, 2003): p. 6.
16. Ibid., p. 15.
17. Ibid., p. 6.
18. Ibid., p. 7.
19. Ibid., p. 8.
20. Ibid., p. 10.
21. Hill, “The FBI’s Handling of the Phoenix Electronic Communication and Investigation of Zacarious Moussaoui Prior to September 11, 2001,” September 24, 2002, http://intelligence.senate.gov/0209hrg/020924/hill.pdf (February 10, 2003): p. 2.
22. Ibid., p. 5.
23. Ibid., p. 9.
24. Ibid., p. 6.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., p. 14.
27. Ibid., p. 16.
28. Ibid., p. 17.
29. Leahy, Patrick, Charles Grassley, and Arlen Specter, “Interim Report on FBI Oversight in the 107th Congress by the Senate Judiciary Committee: FISA Implementation Failures,” February 2003, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2003_rpt/fisa.html (May 3, 2003): p. 13.
30. Katz, Daniel and Robert Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations 2ed., John Wiley & Sons, 1978: p. 109.
31. Zaremba, pp. 125-142.
32. Ibid., pp. 99-102.
33. Hill, “The Intelligence Community’s Knowledge of the September 11 Hijackers Prior to September 11,” 2001,” p. 20.
34. Tompkins, Philip, Organizational Communication Imperatives, Roxbury Publishing Company, 1993: p. 11.
35. Hill, “The Intelligence Community’s Knowledge of the September 11 Hijackers Prior to September 11,” p. 15.
36. Hill, “Counterterrorism Information Sharing with Other Federal Agencies and with State and Local Governments and the Private Sector,” October 1, 2002, http://intelligence.senate.gov/0210hrg/021001/hill.pdf (February 10, 2003): p. 12.
37. Hill, “The Intelligence Community’s Knowledge of the September 11 Hijackers Prior to September 11,” 2001,” p. 10.
38. Hill, “Hearing on the Intelligence Community’s Response to Past Terrorist Attacks Against the United States from February 1993 to September 2001,” October 8, 2002, http://intelligence.senate.gov/0210hrg/021008/hill.pdf (February 10, 2003): p. 25.
39. Hill, “Counterterrorism Information Sharing with Other Federal Agencies and with State and Local Governments and the Private Sector,” p. 6.
40. Zaremba, pp. 126-131.
41. Hill, “The FBI’s Handling of the Phoenix Electronic Communication and Investigation of Zacarious Moussaoui Prior to September 11, 2001,” p. 13.
42. Zaremba, p. 140.
43. Ibid.
44. Message fidelity occurs when the receiver understands the message in the way that the sender intended it to be understood. Zaremba, p. 62.
45. Hill, “Joint Inquiry Staff Statement Part 1,” p. 29.
46. Tompkins, p. 59.
47. Hill, “Counterterrorism Information Sharing with Other Federal Agencies and with State and Local Governments and the Private Sector,” p. 8.
48. Leahy, p. 15.
49. Ibid., p. 26.
50. Ibid., p.14.
51. US Congress, Government Accounting Office, Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges, and Key Management Issues (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2002), p. 3.
52. “Department of Homeland Security Reorganization Plan,” November 25, 2002, http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/reorganization_plan.pdf (May 20, 2003), pp. 6-8.
53. Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges, and Key Management Issues, p. 3.
54. “Ensuring Integrity and Efficiency,” http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=89&content=581 (May 20, 2003).